Explanatory accounts of homogeneity Implicature-based accounts of homogeneity, on the one hand, are explanatory in the sense that that they make clear predictions which expressions give rise to homogeneity and which do not. Such accounts also predict that the nature of non-maximal interpretations in upward monotone environments differs from the one in downward monotone environments. I show that this runs into problems with data suggesting that maximal and non-maximal interpretations can satisfy semantic parallelism. Theories of homogeneity based on truth-value gaps and a pragmatic notion of 'true enough', on the other hand, do not encounter such issues. As things stand, however, they are not automatically predictive in the sense mentioned above. Building on existing works, I explore the idea that the discrepancy between homogeneity-inducing expressions and non-homogeneity-inducing ones tracks a deeper difference in how they compositionally interact with their surrounding expressions: while the former contribute alternatives, the latter do not. Homogeneity is then the consequence of point-wise composition when required by a certain expression, whereas the absence of homogeneity results from "regular" composition.